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“Sólo le pido a Dios 
Que el Futuro no me sea indiferente” 
—León Gieco1
The consideration that our era lives under the 
sign of memory and that this has become the 
main concern of culture in western societies is 
a commonplace. This shift to the past has been 
described as a “memory boom”,2 a “surfeit of 
memory”,3 a “world (that is) being musealised”4 
and as a “desire to commemorate”.5 This “obses-
sion with recalls” has been interpreted in many 
studies: on local, cultural or “from below” mem-
ories, on ways of keeping memories (from me-
morials and monuments to files, movies, biog-
raphies and commemorations, etc), on ways of 
understanding a historiography that looks back 
to the recent past, about politics of memory and 
past uses, among other issues. These studies 
have multiplied in the most varied disciplines, 
including, sociology, social psychology, history, 
psychoanalysis, neurobiology, culture sociolo-
gy, philosophy, etc. The diagnosis seems to be 
unanimous: we are living in a period in which the 
present lives off the past, in a kind of “a present 
past”,6 with the result that we lapse into what 
Hartog calls “presentism”. This past that lives in 
the present has been called “traumatic”,7 “sub-
lime”,8 “espectral”,9 among others. We are expe-
riencing a “new order of time”: “D’un coté ... un 
passé qui n’est pas aboli ni oublié, mais un passé 
duquel ne pouvons à peu prés rien tirer qui nous 
oriente dans le present et nous donne à imagi-
ner le future. De l’autre, un avenir sans la moin-
dre figure.”10 An order of time which casts doubts 
on the future understood as progress. It puts in 
question the modern regime of temporality; “in-
stead of being oriented towards the future, it is 
oriented towards the past”.
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There would also be a coincidence when accepting that this curious fact of living submerged in 
the past comes from the dissolution of the future as it was expressed in the modern promise of 
progress, the catastrophes of the twentieth century being one of the causes of its destruction.11 
These observations are found everywhere. However, few dare to make a diagnosis of this present 
trapped in the past. For many authors, the concept of trauma – both psychoanalytical and neuro-
biological – can be useful to understand the historicity of contemporary societies which were inher-
ited from the tragic events of the recent past.12 However, in my opinion, this response involves two 
types of problems. Firstly, it assumes that there is a “normal” order of time opposed to a “patho-
logical” (traumatic) one. Secondly, it ignores the relation that Koselleck, very carefully, establishes 
between the temporal order and the political one in early modernity. Indeed, the tragic events of the 
twentieth century aided in the destruction of modern temporality. A future perceived as progres-
sive began to dissolve towards the end of the 1970s, and fully vanished by the 1980s. The question 
is: why is this a new order and not a different one?
This article attempts to show that in western societies today, in the absence of absolute founda-
tions and the lack of a frame of meaning that opens new horizons of expectations, a political self-
understanding of the present in terms of the past is beginning to emerge. This is possible because 
the major “catastrophes” of the twentieth century (the Holocaust, Latin American state terrorism, 
the Gulag, etc) have not established a rupture between past and present on the political plane. 
What I am trying to show here is that the kind of break between past and present made possible 
by events such as the French revolution and the fall of the Soviet Union took place because these 
events provoked political ruptures. Because the catastrophes of the twentieth century did not break 
the political order which gave birth to them (the modern secular state), they have created an order 
of time which, without leaving the future aside, feeds itself from the past which is read in the reg-
ister of a memory code. A symptom, among others, of this new order of time would come in the 
creation, in legal terms, of the concept of “crimes against humanity”. 
I
In Sublime Historical Experience, Ankersmit describes four types of forgetting. In the first place, he 
recognises a daily type of forgetting which has no relevance to our present or future identity, for ex-
ample, when we forget what we ate at dinner two days ago. A second type of forgetting is relevant 
to our identity, “but we were simply not aware of this”. Sometimes we forget some details of our 
lives that psychoanalysis shows to be of significance for our personality. However, there are two 
others types of forgetting that Ankersmit calls trauma 1 and trauma 2.13 The two decades of silence 
that followed the Nazi period in Germany after the second world war are, according to Ankersmit, 
the paradigmatic third type of forgetting or trauma 1. As he states, in this type of trauma a painful 
lived experience is repressed with “the curious paradox that traumatic experience is both forgot-
ten and remembered”.14 In this type of forgetting, identity remains intact and can be re-established 
on the condition that this painful past is incorporated into a narrative that achieves a “reconciliation 
of experience and identity”.15 According to his psychoanalytical point of view, the Holocaust, as a 
traumatic event, was repressed (forgotten) after the second world war. However, a “right story” can 
help re-establish that destroyed identity by the incorporation of this catastrophic past. Ankersmit 
states that this type of incorporation “could always be seen as changes in, and not of, our identi-







ties”,16 or, to put it metaphorically, “the building of new cities or highways are changes within the 
borders of our country, changes that leave these borders themselves unaffected”.
Ankersmit also recognises other types of historical events that provoked what he calls a fourth 
type of forgetting, or trauma 2. The French revolution is an example of this type of event. Unlike 
events such as the Holocaust, this trauma 2 generates a definite break, representing the step 
from a previous identity towards one that is totally new and different. For Ankersmit, the French 
revolution creates an “insurmountable barrier” between a pre- and post-revolutionary world: 
“the world would have irrevocably and inexorably acquired “a new identity”.17 The important dif-
ference between this type of trauma and trauma 1 is that the past is totally separated from the 
present in all aspects. Its characteristic of being “the other” is so strong that no story could have 
it as part of a same identity. This past becomes an object of historical research. According to An-
kersmit, the conservatives, who “recognise that they are forever separated from the prerevolu-
tionary past by the abyss between two different historical or cultural identities” could only have 
“a desire to know” that past.18 There is a total break: “We have been ejected, expelled, or exiled 
from the past; or, rather, because of some terrible event (such as the French Revolution) a world 
in which we used to live naively and unproblematically fell apart into a past and a present”.19 In 
Hobsbawm’s terms, “A page in history has been turned.” We “have been ejected from the past” in 
the sense that a former historical identity is “irrevocably lost forever” (the prerevolutionary world) 
and superseded by a new historical identity (the postrevolutionary world). If there is a possible 
reconciliation with trauma 1, there is no possibility with trauma 2, because “the desire of knowl-
edge (the past)” can never be satisfied by “the desire of being”. The reactionaries to the revolu-
tion were not aware that the prerevolutionary world was gone forever and, for Ankersmit, they 
wanted to restore it. For reactionaries “the past is an object of the desire of being – they want to 
be(come) again what the past once was like”.20 Ankersmit also exemplifies this break between 
past (a previous identity) and present (a new identity) with the Hegelian analysis of the conflict 
between Socrates and the Athenian state. Socrates’ sentencing makes sense as far as it rep-
resents the end of the world of traditions of the Athenians, and the beginning of a moral world 
governed by universal principles. By condemning Socrates, the Athenian state was aware that a 
former time in which laws and customs were valid unconditionally, was gone forever. 
Up to here I have dealt with Ankersmit. The question is: what is it that makes some events gen-
erate pasts which appear as different worlds while others do not? Why do some events, like the 
French revolution, and not others, like the Holocaust, produce such a break with the present 
that they generate pasts which can only be objects of knowledge and not objects of desire? How 
do those pasts, which historians can study without interfering with the moral, political and le-
gal areas, which is not the case with the history of the present or the recent past, arise? Why 
could Hobsbawm state, just after it happened, that “very few people would deny that an epoch in 
world history ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the Soviet Union, whatever we read 
into the events of 1989– 91”?21 When can we say that “A page in history has been turned”? Why 
would only a few people – or almost no one – say the same with regard to the Holocaust or the 
terrorism of the Latin American states? Why is the Argentinean Never Again normative? Never 
Again, as I understand it, is more an expression of desire than a confirmation of a rupture. In 
short, why do some events generate a bare historiography and not a history of the present? Or, 
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to put it into the “presence paradigm” terms, why is it that some events generate an “absent-
past” and not a “presence of the past”?22 
The most usual explanation has to do with the distance of the real historical events, at least from 
the theoretical and epistemological approach. This distance, understood in different ways, would 
produce more or less “objective” pasts, with almost no political or moral implications. Phillips, in a 
recently published book,23 admits that distance has little consideration in theory of history. His di-
agnosis is that the “silence” surrounding this topic shows evidence of implicit assumptions on the 
part of historians about our understanding of history.24 He considers the field where historical rep-
resentation meets memory as a good point to start his analysis. He mentions authors like Nora, 
Lowenthal and Novick, who establish a deep division between memory (which denies the relation 
between distance and the recent past) and history (which generates a sense of distance from its 
critical analysis). He considers this description too simplistic. (I also agree here.)
Phillips considers that the distance of the event is not only given, as for example in the Holocaust 
where two generations have already passed, but has also been constructed.25 Firstly, temporal 
distance could not be denied, it is always increasing and, according to how much later we are from 
the event, would involve higher or lower levels of objectivity in the reconstruction depending on 
the historian’s and audience’s interest in the event. “Distance, to put this another way, should re-
fer to a dimension of our relation to the past.”26 So, Phillips, recognises two types of distances.27 
The historical representation makes use of a rhetorical distance that is related to all the strategies 
(textual or not) that allow one to “move away from” or “come closer to” its object. A dense descrip-
tion, i.e. a description replete with details, would emphatically bring the reader closer. This sort of 
description portrays experiences with more details. However, there would be different resources 
that, though connected to dramatic events, would make the cognitive access easier, building a dis-
tance that would prevent a moral or political identification. For Phillips, in the two cases described 
above, the constructive activity prevails on the historian’s side, and it can generate the same dis-
tance effect as the one produced by time. 
However, Phillips’ studies fail to explain why an event like the fall of the Soviet world or the French 
revolution became past in such a way as to transform them into “the other”. Neither the temporal 
proximity of one of them, nor the remoteness of the other, explains this. Consequently, the claim 
stating that historical distance is “constructed” by the historian (at least in these cases) becomes 
invalid. These types of events generate their own breaks without any mediation of retrospective 
temporal distances or distances constructed rhetorically by the historian. But how? Why does An-
kersmit, for example, consider that “a right story” could reconstitute the identity between the pain-
ful Germany of the past and that of the present? Why is state terrorism still a possibility for some 
Argentineans?28
II
In modernity, past becomes the “old time” that must be left aside in order to have access to the 
“new time”. In this way, “old time” experienced as an example, and with it history also experienced 








as example, is cancelled. History as magistra vitae falls when “‘history itself’… [begins] to open up 
a new experiential space”. The past cannot give any example and cannot provide any teaching ei-
ther. Since the expression was coined by Cicero in De Oratore,29 it lasted without interruptions un-
til the eighteenth century. Whether the example that was taken from the past was used to defeat 
any generalisation or to find general rules,30 it has as an assumption the uniformity of human na-
ture. Actually, if we do not assume or believe in the immutability of human nature, the past event 
being recalled loses its quality or usefulness as exemplum.31 This conviction in uniformity was 
shared by Voltaire and Hume, as well as by Montesquieu and Gibbon. In Hume, for example, the 
relation between this philosophical assumption and history appears in many passages of Trea-
tise and Enquiry: 
Would you know the sentiments, inclinations and course of life of the Greeks and Romans? 
Study well the temper and actions of the French and English: You cannot be much mistaken in 
transferring to the former most of the observations which you have made with regard to the 
latter. Mankind are so much the same, in all times and places, that history informs us of noth-
ing new or strange in this particular. Its chief use is only to discover the constant and universal 
principles of human nature, by showing men in all varieties of circumstances and situations, 
and furnishing us with materials from which we may form our observations and become ac-
quainted with the regular springs of human action and behaviour.32
However, the historia magistra vitae collapsed when the French revolution made it clear that no 
future is ever warranted and that experience is not enough to anticipate it. The new “nation-states” 
needed a past, “passéime”,33 an origin, an inscription in memory, to legitimise the incarnation of 
political, religious and military institutions in a space. In other words, the nation-states needed a 
past to which to resort as tradition and whose identity referred to the temporal landmarks which 
had to be commemorated. Before the American and French revolutions, memory used to separate 
more than unify. Only the aristocracy, church and monarchy had something similar to an “institu-
tionalised” memory. Leaving the elites aside, which were responsible for the archives, genealogy 
and commemorations, ordinary people felt the past as part of their present, without the urgent 
need to recover or store it. 
This started to change at the end of the eighteenth century, when the new nation-states needed 
people who had never met before or shared anything to consider themselves as sharing a “com-
mon history”.34 Now the past, understood as a shared heritage, must be celebrated and commem-
orated, to assure a national identity that projects itself towards a better future: “A naïve confidence 
that the political upheaval meant regeneration and inaugurated a reign of justice and happiness 
pervaded France in the first period of the Revolution.”35 This confidence overwhelmed people such 
as Condorcet, one of the most fervent theoreticians of progress, even when writing his Esquisse 
d’un tableau historique des progrès de l’esprit humain (1795) during Robespierre’s terror. 
According to Koselleck, modernity is misunderstood if the novelty that it introduces is interpreted 
only as a “new time” (neue Zeit) or a new order of time in which the modern concept of future and 
its correlate, progress, would have given birth to our concept of history. A very well-known par-
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agraph from Koselleck’s Futures Past describes the rupture between “space of experience” (Er-
fahrungsraum) and “horizon of expectation” (Erwartungshorizont): 
A consistent discovery in the following studies is the fact that the more a particular time is ex-
perienced as a new temporality, as “modernity”, the more demands on the future increase.36 ... 
What was new about the expectation of the future that typified progress? … The future of this 
progress is characterised by two main features: first, the increasing speed with which it ap-
proaches us, and second, its unknown quality. “Unknown” because this accelerated time, i.e., 
our history, abbreviated the space of experiences, robbed them of their constancy.37
This new order of historicity, which had an impact on the birth of historiography in the nineteenth 
century, cannot be understood, regardless of its political implication. The gap between past and 
the new beginning that these modern times establish38 is the result of a political rupture. Kosel-
leck explains the rupture that the French Revolution caused as the result of a process39 that started 
in the sixteenth century with the failure of the empire and the birth of a new relation between re-
ligion and politics. “What consequences did the new arrangement of politics and religion have for 
the construction of the modern apprehension of time?”40 The religious wars weakened the belief in 
the Last Judgment prophecy in such a way that the Holy Roman empire began to lose its escha-
tological function. A new future, as a field of probabilities, appeared. The development of the pres-
ent action depended now on the predictions made by politicians, bearing in mind the lesser evil. 
The prediction represents the temporal structure of absolutistic politics, which is a type of politics 
that predated the one developed at the end of the eighteenth century. It was a politics that “had not 
yet fundamentally ruptured the plane of Christian expectations”.41 One of the characteristics of the 
prediction in the absolutist state is that it introduces the past in the future, since it is based on a 
calculation of probabilities. This new idea, which brought philosophies of history about the future 
through the concept of progress, accelerated time in such a way that no space of experience can 
be anticipated. This new idea started appearing before the French revolution. Koselleck never loses 
sight of the political reality of his temporal analysis: “The bearer of the modern philosophy of his-
torical process was the citizen emancipated from absolutist subjectivation and the tutelage of the 
church: the prophète philosophe.”42 The separation between past and present that modernity es-
tablished is a political one, as it is well exemplified in a Malchus’ quotation: “for in a state like ours, 
founded on victory, there is no past. It is a creation, in which – as in the creation of the universe – 
everything that is present is but raw material in the hand of the creator by whom it is transformed 
into existence.”43 The analysis of the new order of time must not be carried out independently from 
the political action since “it is man’s task to get to the golden future”.
However, progressivism feeds on its own poison. In Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, 
published in 1830, Hegel writes
when we see the evil, the wickedness, and the downfall of the most flourishing empires the 
human spirit has created; and when we are moved to profound pity for the untold miseries of 
individual human beings … Without rhetorical exaggeration, we need only compile an accurate 
account of the misfortunes which have over taken the finest manifestations of national and po-
litical life, and personal virtues of innocence, to see a most terrifying picture take shape before 








our eyes ... But even as we look upon history as an altar on which the happiness of nations, the 
wisdom of states and the virtue of individuals are slaughtered, our thoughts inevitably impel 
us to ask: to whom, or to what ultimate end have these monstrous sacrifices been made?44
The reality of the World Spirit, the final subject of history, depends on the actions, tendencies and 
institutions that represent reason and freedom. The law of history representing the World Spirit 
operates therefore above individuals and peoples. “The history is, then, understood, as the develop-
ment of a history of right to freedom.”45 Justice is realised through universal history. “History then 
appears as ‘the slaughter bench’ at which the happiness of peoples, the wisdom of states, and the 
virtue of individuals have been victimised.” Hegel at the same time extols the sacrifice of individuals 
and the resulting general happiness. He calls it “the cunning of reason”. “Individuals lead unhappy 
lives, they toil and perish, but though they actually never win their goal, their distress and defeat are 
the very means by which truth and freedom proceed.”46 In Philosophy of Law, Hegel declares that 
the rights of a state are subordinated to the rights of the World Spirit and to the trial of universal 
history. The history of a nation must be judged according to its contributions to the progress of all 
humankind towards free self-consciousness. What is considered catastrophic and unhappy from 
the individual’s point of view becomes a slight accident, or rather a “ruse of reason”, that governs 
from behind the order of things. Under the appearance of violence or barbarism, human passions 
reach their highest destiny. The triumphal entourage of history moves, hence, along with those 
who sow the ground, as Walter Benjamin writes.47
Modernity reversed its relation with antiquity when it began considering the latter as a child and 
not as a parent. Modernity understands human gender as an eternal subject that, with time, will 
achieve total control of its own destiny. Individuals die but their suffering helps to build the aim of 
humanity that, as well as being universal, is immortal. “However puzzling this may be, it is neces-
sary if one assumes that a species of animals should have a reason, and, as a class of rational be-
ings each of whom dies while the species is immortal, should develop their capacities to perfec-
tion.”48 From this progressive perspective, although the rights of communities may be taken away, 
those deplorable acts do not call into question the positive movement of the civilisation. Even when, 
legally or morally, humankind acts wrongly, historically humanity does not stop fulfilling its destiny. 
III
This régime of historicity,49 the order of time mentioned above, has changed. The relation that the 
future established between humankind, individuals and their humanity, considering their generic 
and universal characteristics, is inverted, in a single movement, when one becomes conscious of 
the atrocities committed in the twentieth century. “Crimes against humanity” has become the legal 
definitions of these atrocities. Defined in the Nuremberg charter in 1945,50 ratified in Tokyo a year 
later, and declared “imprescriptible” by the United Nations and “imprescriptible by their nature” in 
French law in 1964, crimes against humanity represent the condemnation that “progress could no 
longer do without its victims”, as Finkielkraut states. As Arendt writes, the judges, who defined hu-
man gender on the basis of its diversity and not its progress, and who became conscious that it is 
not the human being who lives on Earth but men and women in their endless diversity, spoke on 
behalf of the whole of international society since they believed that it was this society which had 
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suffered irreparable damage “when one of its racial, national or cultural elements disappears”. With 
the registration of human rights for humanity within a legal sphere, the self-realisation dogma of 
the human species in history was refuted. The “criminal enterprise against the human condition” 
that was created, according to Friedlander, “once a regime decides that groups, whatever the crite-
ria may be, should be annihilated there and then and never be allowed to live on Earth”,51 involved 
the discovery that humankind is not the instrument of a humanity that progresses in spite of the 
annihilation of groups. 
The inversion of the relationship between particular (men and women) and universal human-
kind and the timelessness of the acts committed, redefines, among other things, the question of 
the historical experience of injustice. The interpretation of history in terms of an immanent jus-
tice becomes incoherent. Men and women are the ones who accept past wrongdoings and be-
come responsible for those acts in the face of history. What is the result of attributing to oneself, 
in the present, the consequences of the actions that others committed in the past and for which 
now, among other things, forgiveness is being claimed? In other words, what does a “subversive” 
change52 mean within the legal sphere if carried out in the same political order? It means taking 
responsibility for the future consequences of past actions and, in the imputation of the act, recog-
nising the historical identity of those who committed the crime, and of those who were blamed. 
The retrospective movement of the assignment of responsibility establishes the subject’s identity 
through time. We are in the inversion of modern temporality: the identity of the historical subject, 
the state, escapes to the past instead of the future.53 This idea of the state as historical subject with 
a new orientation in time coexists with multiple subjects such as social or ethnic minorities. In this 
situation, the essential contingency of the post-revolutionary alliance between the state and the 
nation is revealed.54
This new order of time is not only expressed in this legal innovation but also in other issues. First-
ly, the present historicises itself and, therefore, “histories of the present” or the recent past born in 
1978, promoted by Bédarida, flourish. The events, which were lived or experienced by some mem-
bers of generations that are contemporary to the historian are the new objects of history. Secondly, 
universal history disintegrates; “history crumbles”, as Dosse so graphically describes. “We abandon 
significant periods in favour of the daily life of little people. A new esthetic topography takes over 
when we speak of villages, of women, of immigrants, of who are marginalised.”55 Thirdly, on the 
other hand, historia magistra vitae appears again hidden behind Todorov’s “exemplar memory”, 
in spite of Koselleck’s warning in 1973 about the uselessness of deducing learning from history.56 
From a psychoanalytical approach, Todorov distinguishes a literal from an exemplary memory and 
makes a distinction with his critics about the uses of memory. A group’s past painful event “is pre-
served in its litéralité; it remains single, impassable, it does not lead beyond itself”.57 Hence, a rela-
tion of proximity between the group’s past and present is established, extending the consequences 
of the initial trauma to all the moments of existence. The other form of recollection, the exemplary, 
is characterised by recovering the past nature of the event, and, without leaving aside its singularity, 
transforming it into the model to follow in the present when confronted by new situations. Memory 
becomes an exemplum and a “principle of action” for the present. The future stubbornness reo-
pens the old topoi of history understood as magistra vitae, which one of its assumptions, as Kosel-








leck points out, is the uniformity of human nature. The past as an example can only be considered 
when continuity with the present is identified, and therefore the “duty to remember” makes sense.
IV
I have now addressed how the orders of time are connected. In this section, I will provide an anal-
ysis. As terrible or unmentionable as the twentieth-century genocides were – Hobsbawm called 
them “catastrophes” – they were not able to disrupt the political structures from which they arose. 
Although they changed the orders of time by establishing a new temporal regime with the concept 
of “crimes against humanity”, they did so by preserving the political world in which they originated. 
Present institutions completely identify with their past selves. I believe that the Argentina of today, 
for instance, is “better” than the Argentina that existed under a dictatorial government; the Germany 
of today is “better” than the Weimar republic. It is possible to perform a qualitative assessment only 
when identification is acknowledged. Such identities reside in the structure of the modern nation-
state in whose framework Latin American state terrorism and the Holocaust were possible and 
through which the conditions are preserved that make it possible for these events to continue to 
occur. To deny this is to deny the “disappearance” of Jorge Julio López in 2006,58 the coup d’état in 
Honduras in 2009, and the mass killing of thousands of civilians carried out by “democratic states” 
in the name of human rights. This temporal continuity makes it understandable, for example, that 
a president could apologise publicly for atrocities that he did not commit. This is a historical pecu-
liarity of the twentieth century.59 Because the present is understood in terms of the past, the “duty 
to remember” is imperative;60 we must remember if we are to avoid repeating our mistakes. This 
imperative will remain in force until a new political world is established whose structure makes it 
impossible for such atrocities to be repeated. 
“All beginnings contain an element of recollection.” For Connerton,61 the element of memory is 
particularly necessary when a group is struggling to establish a new regime. Within the sequence 
of a temporal experience, a new beginning threatens to abolish temporal continuity. Conscious of 
this new beginning, a group typically establishes a yearly holiday to memorialise and preserve the 
rupture. For Connerton, the trial and execution of Louis XVI clearly demonstrate an intention to es-
tablish a new social order: “the trial by fiat of a successor regime is like the construction of a wall.”62 
This barrier is built to avoid future transgressions. The trial and execution of Louis XVI were not 
merely the assassination of a monarch, but the revocation of a legislative principle: the agreement 
that a dynasty was the only possible political system. The execution represented part of a process 
of rupture with the ancien régime. Later named the French Revolution, July 14 was established as a 
day to commemorate this event.63 Connerton clearly describes the problems encountered by “new” 
regimes. For example, problems arise when some forms of property confiscation used by the old 
regime become, within the new regime, “punishable” and unfair. This situation raises the follow-
ing question: what obligations do those who were the executors of past injustices have towards 
their former victims in the new regime? Connerton asks: “How far must one go when taking into 
account the memory of past injustice, in wiping clean the historical record of illegitimate acts?” He 
answers ambiguously when he builds a barrier between the new beginning and the old tyranny, a 
barrier that ultimately recollects the old tyranny.64 Remembering the past allows a better regime 
to be realised. However, creating obligations to compensate past injustices would not be beneficial 
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under the new laws, which prevent these injustices from being repeated. The collapse of the Soviet 
world, for example, marked a political rupture from the regime that had begun with the Russian 
revolution. As a modern revolution, the Russian Revolution had expressed the modern promise of 
progress; the fall of the Berlin Wall signalled its end. Who should be held responsible for the repa-
ration of Soviet atrocities? Once the USSR disappeared as a political entity, no political subject could 
assume the responsibility and financially compensate the “past victims”. It is possible to establish 
a “truth commission” to determine historical truth, but no financial compensation can be granted. 
“Transitional justice” becomes meaningless in the contexts of the American, French and Russian 
revolutions, which are conceived as revolutions meant to disrupt the political order. Consequently, 
Connerton is mistaken when he equates the trial and execution of Louis XVI with the Nuremberg 
trials, in which “crimes against humanity” were punished. 
The legal concept of “crimes against humanity” is incredibly “enlightened”. Such crimes could not 
be conceived of or understood without a shared belief in the uniform identity of “humankind”. Those 
who declare that crimes against humanity are timeless, “imprescriptible by their nature”, punish a 
future that shares the same political order as the present order in which such crimes are allowed 
to occur. This concept is extremely pessimistic about future generations. It assumes that future 
generations will not be capable of generating another political order (a “new” regime) in which the 
atrocities committed under the modern political order would become unthinkable. Thus, crimes 
against humanity, as legal objects, are corrupted by the principle of universalism because they can 
forever punish the same crime. Nora poignantly expresses this idea in the conclusion of his analy-
sis of the obsession with commemorations. Speaking of the French case, he says: “Today’s options 
make sense only for this present moment when French people have a different collective lifestyle 
and when they feel comfortable within a framework that cannot even be called identity, and there-
fore the need to exhume past marks and explore the places will disappear. The era of commemo-
ration will definitely be left behind: ‘The tyranny of memory will have lasted only a moment’.”65 Per-
chance, in the future, another world will exist in which people have a different collective lifestyle, 
perhaps so different that historiography, as we know it today, will be useless. 
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